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equate expression" of the psychical life of the past and of the present ; which agrees with Professor Giddings's conclusion that the function of social organisation is the evolution of personality. The work of Professor Fairbanks has two chapters on the influence of natural selection in human society, where it insures the survival of the fittest individuals, the fittest groups, and the fittest institutions. Struggle is raised to the psychical plane, and its aim is supremacy instead of destruction. To Professor Giddings also society is a psychical phenomenon, but physical energy is the source of all its activity and equilibration of energy the cause of all its changes, social progress being thus a phase of physical evolution under the influence of the psychical factor. The relation of psychology to sociology is a practical question of great moment, and Professor Giddings's view of it is seen in the statement, that "psychology is the science of the association of ideas. Sociology is the science of the association of minds." But as psychology is concerned with "the genesis and with the combinations of the elements of mind," it is rather the science of the association of states of consciousness than of ideas. Professor Fairchild's opinion is that the individual mind does not exist until it is developed in society. So that psychology has to deal with man in society, and sociology with "the psychical life which arises when men enter into organic union." Thus, "the subject of the two sciences is the same, and the difference between them is simply a difference of standpoint." We would suggest that the principles are the same in each, but that one is concerned with the individual mind and the other with the general or social mind.

There are various other matters dealt with by these two works which might be referred to, but we will content ourselves with saying generally that, notwithstanding the criticisms we have felt bound to make, they are both deserving of much commendation. In a sense they may be regarded as complementary to one another each supplying the other's deficiencies. If the student reads first Professor Fairbanks's "Introduction to Sociology" and then the "Principles" of Professor Giddings, which we should state has an excellent index, he will obtain a very fair knowledge of the nature, scope, and aim of sociology. C. STANILAND WAKE.

SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE. By *William Caldwell, M. A., D. Sc.* New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. Pages, 538. Price, \$3.00 net.

That the interest in the philosophy and personality of Schopenhauer continues unabated is evidenced by the respectable number of contributions which yearly make their appearance, expounding, criticising, or developing his views. One of the latest of these is by William Caldwell, Professor of Moral and Social Philosophy in the Northwestern University at Evanston, and formerly of the universities of Edinburgh and St. Andrews. Professor Caldwell's book, which is rather a portly volume, but bears withal the marks of profound scholarship and thorough philosophical culture, is not a didactic exposition of Schopenhauer's philosophy de-

signed to initiate the reader into the primary elements of the latter's system, but an attempt "to suggest the significance of Schopenhauer's thought as an organic work." The author has tried to connect Schopenhauer "with some few broad lines of philosophical and general thought—with some few broad principles of human nature." The selection of Schopenhauer as the theme most distinctly adapted to exhibiting the bent and upshot of modern thought, is explained by the fact that Professor Caldwell regards him, with Von Hartmann, as representing together one-half of modern philosophy. Von Hartmann Professor Caldwell hopes to be able to treat in a subsequent volume.

The present work is divided into ten chapters. The first considers Schopenhauer's significance. The second and third, which treat of his idealism and his theory of knowledge, attempt to dig down to the theoretical roots of his philosophy. The fourth chapter is concerned with the "bondage of life," from which art and ethics and religion are supposed to set us free. Chapters V., VI., VII., and VIII. present Schopenhauer's philosophy of art, his moral philosophy, and his philosophy of religion, by which he is mainly known to the general public of to-day. Chapter IX. treats of his "Metaphysic," and is designed to exhibit the fundamental character of his thought as a whole. The last chapter essays a positive statement of his system. In this and the "Epilogue" the author suggests points "which might form the material for further study and exposition."

Having stated the contents, we shall now notice some of the conclusions which Professor Caldwell has reached, omitting critical comment.

"It is the service of Schopenhauer," says Professor Caldwell, "to have reversed the whole process of German philosophy, and to have looked at man from the side of irrational action and passion, things to which Kant's ethics and Hegel's system had done scant justice. He really wrote about the 'natural man' for 'all time,' saying, perhaps, the last word on that subject in philosophy."

We should naturally be tempted to regard this reversion as a degeneration, but far from being a retrograde philosopher, Schopenhauer is a direct successor of Kant, "although, perhaps, on an opposite line to that of Hegel." Practically, Schopenhauer took his stand upon science, but he placed limitations upon its potency as a speculative instrument. Besides his unsystematic methods slightly offset his advantage in this respect; as Goethe was a *Gelegenheitsdichter*, so Schopenhauer was a *Gelegenheitsphilosoph*, making "little serious attempt to correlate his own thought with any other system in existence save, perhaps the Kantian philosophy."

Though "Schopenhauer's system has a strong materialistic coloring, it is not materialism. It is rather animalism or panpsychism. His theory of life is essentially metaphysical; living beings are individuations of the will to live, the principles of individuations being space and time." He accepted the Berkeley-Kantian analysis of reality, which, of course, excluded the slightest suspicion of materialistic leanings. Virtually he contends "for a new kind of idealism about reality, a dynamic idealism in which the reality of all things is determined by the

function and purpose they discharge in the cosmic process." He maintained that the world is will, and will means for him force or impulse; "but," says Professor Caldwell, "he still conceives of will in primarily a negative way. He comes in the end to tell us what the world *is not*, and what the end of life *is not*." We may detect here the germ of his Buddhistic and pessimistic predilections.

The result is a sort of illusionism, which Schopenhauer essays to escape from by his peculiar treatment of the religious problem. "In its highest reaches," says Professor Caldwell, "Schopenhauer's philosophy becomes virtually a metaphysic of the redemption of the individual from his own misery and from that of the world. . . . His treatment of religion is important. It is essentially different from that of Kant and from rationalism generally, laying far more stress on the peculiarly religious feelings as elements in the solution of the religious problem."

It is no adequate characterisation of Schopenhauer's philosophy, Professor Caldwell thinks, to call it pessimism. "Schopenhauer himself attached quite as much importance to the positive aspects of his system as to the negative." His success among the degenerates is owing to the circumstance that "it is naturally comforting at times to be able to put one's self in the hands of a man who had the strength to assault all intellectual presuppositions and theories about life whatsoever, and, in particular, to help to overturn a philosophy whose proudest boast it was to exhibit the intellect or the idea as actually victorious over both nature and history." His success generally is due to the fact that his philosophy chronicles "the effort a century has had to make to reconcile its ideal theories about life with the facts that science has disclosed or thinks it has discovered."

Lastly, Professor Caldwell emphasises Schopenhauer's contempt for dogma and history, which incapacitated him from understanding and justly appreciating even his own mission, which was to "correlate idealism and realism, Platonism and life." Therein, according to Professor Caldwell, lay his real work, of which, however, strange to say, he was absolutely unconscious. As to his influence, "he appealed to those who were without any gospel, to those who felt that the will was at the bottom of everything, but who yet could not feel that they had been wrong in believing something else to be at the bottom of everything. The reckoning thing about him and those who began to listen to his teaching was that both he and they had got hold of a fact greater, perhaps, than they could reckon with, but still a fact."

From the preceding statements we may, perhaps, also gather some inkling of Professor Caldwell's own views.

T. J. McC.

GRUNDRISSE DER GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, ZUM SELBSTSTUDIUM UND FÜR VORLESUNGEN. Von Dr. Johannes Rehmke, o. ö. Professor der Philosophie zu Greifswald. Berlin: Carl Duncker. 1896. Pages, 308.

The literature of Germany is extraordinarily rich in histories of philosophy, and their number seems to be steadily on the increase. The last to enter the field is